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Abstract 
Historians of India’s foreign policy have often failed to see beyond the ‘Great 
man’ Jawaharlal Nehru. This Nehru-centric vision is not only misleading, but 
unfair to Nehru. Here, we seek to take the gaze off Nehru and New Delhi so 
as to view Indian foreign policy from different locations. We examine the 
ways in which India’s diplomats in Australia, Canada and South Africa 
resisted racial discrimination. India’s anti-racist diplomacy has most often 
been viewed as pointless moralistic ranting: the domain of the 
‘hypersensitive, emotional’ Indian. We argue, however, based on largely 
unexamined archival material and an emphasis on the practice of Indian 
diplomacy, that India’s diplomats in these bastions of settler-colonial racism 
were tactful, strategic and effective in challenging racist, colonial practices 
and bringing an anti-racist discourse to international politics. Nehruvian 
foreign policy discourse, and its goal of an anti-racist world order, then, was 
tempered by its diplomatic practices. In particular, this occurred outside of 
New Delhi in places where India’s hopes for productive international 
relationships clashed with its Nehruvian worldview.  
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Introduction: India’s postcolonial Foreign Policy Beyond the ‘Great Man’ 
Even half a century after Nehru’s passing, his foreign policy remains both misunderstood and 
deeply politicized. Most assessments of Nehru remain overwritten and yet curiously under-
researched.1 As Bajpai (2009) and Mallavarapu (2009) have argued, foreign policy analysis 
in India often lacks theoretical or descriptive richness, even if it is analytically rigorous. 
Thick descriptive accounts based on rich archival work are few and far between, which 
means that foreign policy analysis is predominantly based on either secondary accounts or 
inbred theoretical predispositions. This is perhaps most true of studies on Nehru’s foreign 
policy. On the one hand, many have raised his foreign policy to a high pedestal, but on the 
other, a good majority of current analysts have been overly critical of Nehru’s supposed 
moralistic rants. In a standard account of his foreign policy, for instance, Jaswant Singh 
vividly described it as ‘almost always moralistic, needlessly arrogant, argumentative, 
mistaking such attitude as being an assertion of national pride’.2 A host of other astute foreign 
policy analysts have, sometimes sweepingly, dismissed Nehruvian foreign policy as ‘non-
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existent’, ‘abnormal’ or not ‘grown up’. 3 In contrast, a more situated understanding of those 
years emerges in some of recent archival work. Here, we seek to add to this relatively-thin-
but-growing body of literature which gives us a richer picture of Nehruvian years while also 
providing theoretical insights into his foreign policy.4  
 
Two methodological concerns animate our discussions below. First, we are bolstered 
by the new ‘practice turn’ in IR which ‘zooms in on the quotidian unfolding of international 
life’. 5  This ‘practice turn’ emphasizes not a dull recording of events, but decrypts the 
everyday of the ‘international’. It forces us ‘to engage with the relationship between agency 
and the social and natural environments, with both material and discursive factors, and with 
the simultaneous practice of stability and change’.6 In other words, the study of practices 
helps us to unearth the intricate links between discourses, actions and institutions through the 
critical analysis of the day-to-day actions of diplomats. Practices are everyday rituals where 
meanings are generated, enacted and reproduced. The practice of diplomacy in  this case 
reveals to us the rough edges that the discourse of foreign policy often flattens, but more so it 
helps us to appreciate how the discourse of Nehruvian foreign policy shaped, and was shaped 
by, the practice of international diplomacy and India’s national interests. 
 
Here, we see postcolonial India’s national interest not as given by the system, but as 
socially and historically constructed – specifically by the colonial experience. India’s 
interests were mutually constituted with its identity. 7  As Priya Chacko has shown, the 
guiding discourse of Nehruvian foreign policy was an effort to create a more ethical 
modernity and a decolonized international system. 8  India’s interests, then, lay in a 
decolonized world order in which it could act independently and without facing old colonial 
prejudices. How, though, did this clash with day-to-day diplomatic practices? How did 
diplomats maintain friendly relations with potentially useful partners (like Canada and 
Australia, less so South Africa) and yet live up to Nehru’s postcolonial project? Here, we 
consider the ways in which India’s diplomats navigated the thin line between upholding 
India’s declared principle of anti-racism in the still-racist White Dominions and staying 
within the established principles of diplomatic conduct. When it came to foreign policy, an 
Indian diplomat once describe Nehru as the painter – he was the one who set up the discourse 
- while the diplomats were ‘merely touch-up artists’ and ‘brokers’. 9  But invariably, the 
burden of making the painting saleable was placed on just these ‘touch-up artists’. This 
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required finding textures and strategies suited to their particular context. In the final analysis, 
it was the painting itself that was suitably enhanced by these diplomats. 
 
This leads to our second methodological issue. The excessive focus on Nehru in 
studies of what is known as ‘Nehruvian’ foreign policy, while understandable, is also one of 
the reasons why these studies remain constrained. The obsession with locating all foreign 
policy activity at the feet of Nehru leads to an overemphasis on his agency. Archival sources 
instead lead us to alternative narratives on foreign policy that could confirm, correct or 
contest Nehru’s ideas.  In seeking to draw from this narrative multiverse, we have chosen to 
write histories of little-known and lost diplomats, and avoided tracing diplomatic history only 
at the centre of decision making, (i.e. either Nehru or the Ministry of External Affairs). We 
attempt to write our narrative from the diplomatic field and see how the diplomats located 
outside India contributed to the development of a postcolonial foreign policy discourse.  
 
Bearing in mind these methodological preferences, we look at India’s diplomatic 
practice with regard to three major settler-colonial states in the Commonwealth – South 
Africa, Canada and Australia – in the pre-Bandung era. We begin in 1946 when the interim 
government under Nehru came to power and close with India’s ending of diplomatic relations 
with South Africa in 1954. Post-1954, India’s Commonwealth diplomacy entered a new 
phase for two reasons. First, it had exhausted all bilateral diplomatic tools with South Africa 
and hence the focus shifted to the UN. Second, with Bandung conference, a whole new set of 
alliances and actors campaigned for a non-racial world order. Until then, India stood as the 
most significant agent that consistently strived for a non-racial world order. 
 
India’s diplomacy, as we will argue below, tight-rope walked between campaigning 
for non-racialism while seeking to interfere, sometimes subtly, sometimes openly, in the 
domestic jurisdiction of its fellow Commonwealth states. By making calculated strategic 
choices, Indian diplomats navigated the terrain of the post-world war normative order, which 
was beginning to be more open to questioning racism - following the ‘boomerang effect’, as 
Aime Cesaire called it, of Nazism - but was still reluctant enough to embrace global non-
racial norms.10 The decolonisation process had pushed countries like India to the forefront of 
the calls for non-racial world order, but it had still not caught significant momentum of its 
own to generate non-western solidarity of the post-Bandung era. In this in-between phase, 
Indian diplomats posted in the White Dominions of the Commonwealth had to tread a 
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cautious line that advanced the Indian non-racial agenda but also did not offend their hosts by 
stepping on their domestic jurisdiction.  
 
‘Presenting the New Spirit of Independent India’: India’s South African Policy 
We will begin with the most challenging environment for Indian diplomats to engage with, 
South Africa, before moving on to examples where Indian diplomats had to be more cautious. 
India’s complaint to the United Nations against the treatment of Indians in South Africa was 
its inaugural diplomatic move in world affairs.11 Before taking the case to the UN, India had 
already broken off trade ties with South Africa and recalled its High Commissioner R.M. 
Deshmukh for consultations. Shrewdly, however, India’s moral outrage was channelled 
strategically. By presenting this recall as only ‘for consultations’, India let an otherwise fully 
functioning High Commission remain in the country thereby keeping its diplomatic ears close 
to the developments in South Africa.12  
 
The 1940s were turning out to be a difficult time for South African Indians with the 
hardening of the racial laws in the country. The promulgation of the Ghetto Act in 1946, 
which had forced India to impose trade sanctions and recall the High Commissioner, led to a 
new phase in the Indian struggle in South Africa. A new generation of younger, more radical 
leaders stood up against the more conservative leadership within the Indian community and 
Indians launched a movement against the South African government. The High Commission, 
established in 1927 first as the office of the Agent and upgraded to High Commission in 
1941, had traditionally played the role of a mediator between the three parties – the South 
African government, South African Indians and the Indian government.  From the middle of 
the 1940s, however, a number of changes – both international and national – drastically 
altered the context in which the High Commission operated. The normative transformation of 
the international system, India’s independence, South Africa turn to the extreme right in the 
form of apartheid, and the shift in the leadership within the Indian community transformed 
not only the nature of relationship among the three parties but also pushed the High 
Commission to jettison its role as a mediator in favour of actively pushing for the principle of 
non-racialism. 
  
India had commenced a high pitched battle with South Africa, led by Jan Smuts, at 
the UN.13 The newly independent India needed all its diplomatic mettle against Smuts. There 
were suggestions that either Nehru or Gandhi should lead the Indian delegation.14 Expecting 
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that the case at the UN would be fierce and long drawn-out, India needed the High 
Commission to relay information on the fast changing situation in South Africa, convey the 
sentiments of South African Indians, keep the MEA informed of South Africa’s expected 
diplomatic strategy and act as a point of both formal and informal contact between the two 
governments. 
 
 With the High Commissioner back in Delhi, the Secretary to the High Commissioner 
was the most senior Indian official in Pretoria. In 1946, the Secretary was a British Civil 
Servant, J.M. Meldrum who, in the opinion of Shafaat Ahmed Khan, the High Commissioner 
from 1941-1945, was ‘loyal to the H.C. [High Commissioner] though spiritually he is 
European in sympathy and outlook’. 15  On the South African issue, it was generally 
understood that the British sympathized more with their white Commonwealth partner, South 
Africa, and its leader, Jan Smuts. With Churchill as Prime Minister, Amery as the Secretary 
of State and Wavell as the Viceroy of India – all personal friends of Smuts – the British 
administration had tried its utmost to dilute the Indian reaction to South Africa.16 In 1946, 
when India finally took up the issue at the UN, the Commonwealth Relations Department, led 
by an Indian politician N.B. Khare and an Indian civil servant, R.N. Banerjee, was keen to 
pursue it broadly as an issue of racism. However, the British-dominated Indian External 
Affairs Department successfully suggested keeping it confined to the treatment of Indians, 
citing probable opposition from the United States.17 One could speculate as to whether or not 
that might be reason enough to limit a case of such importance - but there was definitely an 
impression that the British civil servants were more concerned about not embarrassing Jan 
Smuts. 
 
 Meldrum’s bi-weekly reports to the Ministry of External Affairs reflected his British 
conservatism. He was, as Shafaat Ahmad Khan had warned, “mixed up with [the South 
African Indian moderate leader] Kajee” and in his reports, he was consistently partial to the 
moderate leadership in South Africa. 18  The moderate leadership, mostly consisting of 
merchants, was more amenable to reaching a convenient settlement with the South African 
government, if the latter preserved their financial interests. In contrast, the radical leadership, 
led by Yusuf Dadoo, was more representative of a wider section of South African Indian 
interests and took a more principled stance against racism. The latter also enjoyed the support 
of the Indian National Congress.  The moderates were also prone to being used by the South 
African government to influence the Indian government to keep the issue localized. The 
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radicals, however, wanted to internationalize the issue and generally favoured the stance 
being adopted by the Indian government.  
 
 This disjuncture between the South African Indian interests and the High Commission 
was resolved when Meldrum was replaced by an Indian diplomat, Rajagopala Thiruvenkata 
Chari. Cambridge-educated Chari was serving in Ceylon before he was sent to South Africa 
in his mid-30s.  His arrival in South Africa coincided with the ouster of Jan Smuts, another 
Cambridge alumnus, from power. In the next three years of his stay in South Africa, not only 
did Chari correct Meldrum’s bias in his communication with the MEA, but he also proved to 
be far more imaginative than his predecessor in suggesting diplomatic manoeuvres. 
 
R.T. Chari and the Indian Question in South Africa 
‘Presenting to [the South African Indians] the new spirit of an independent India’, Chari 
arrived in South Africa free of any pro-British sympathies of Meldrum. 19  He quickly 
understood the dynamics of the internal politics of South African Indians and differed starkly 
from his predecessor. Sensing that the moderate leadership was both egocentric (if not 
racially inspired) and less popular, Chari brought the Indian government solidly behind the 
radical group of Yusuf Dadoo and G.M. Naicker. This shift in support was accompanied by 
subtle but significant changes in India’s overall position on the South African issue.  
 
Hitherto, the Indian struggle in South Africa under the moderates had kept itself 
separate from the African struggle and insisted on continuing this seclusion. The new radical 
leadership had instead favoured solidarity with the Africans. In 1946, Nehru before being 
appointed to the Interim Government had come strongly in favour of a joint struggle by 
Indians and Africans in South Africa and favoured the radicals when Dadoo and Naicker 
visited India in 1947.20 Despite this, in official positions, the Indian government had not 
extended its diplomatic support to Africans in South Africa. Conscious of the stand of the 
moderates, the Indian government, well into 1950, was sending ambivalent signals about its 
support for the joint struggle.21 Firmly backing the radicals, Chari asked the government to 
extend its solidarity to the Africans and the African National Congress (ANC). He, in fact, 
became the first diplomat from India to maintain close contacts with African leaders in South 
Africa.22 He advised the government to use every opportunity to extend symbolically its 
support to the African population in South Africa. Strongly pushing for making anti-racism a 
sign-post of new India’s foreign policy, he proposed organizing an ‘“Anti-Racial 
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Discrimination”’ conference on the lines of the Asian Relations conference. This, in his view, 
would help in coordination of a drive against such discrimination in South Africa.23 Likewise, 
he admonished the moderate section for keeping the struggle limited to Indians.24 Using his 
position as a link between the Indian government and the Indian population in South Africa, 
he advised both sides to broaden their political support to include Africans.  
 
Chari’s counsel for broadening India’s support to the Africans was also driven by an 
acute analysis of Prime Minister Malan’s grand designs of White pan-Africanism. Malan had 
expounded a pan-African unity of white governments in Africa ‘to secure unity in colour 
policy and co-operation in defence’. 25  This was not new. Smuts had expressed similar 
ambitions for a ‘federation of white-controlled states’.26 In Chari’s opinion, South Africa’s 
internal racism ought to be seen in conjunction with its external attempts at creating a pan-
African unity of white governments in Africa. Given the significant diasporic presence of 
Indians in eastern and southern Africa, this was a worrying sign and India must subvert these 
designs by building a broader solidarity with Africans.27 While the MEA thought of this 
picture as ‘overdrawn’,28 the general advice of broadening the agenda was realized in 1952 
when India helped in the introduction of racial discrimination under apartheid a separate 
agenda item at the UN General Assembly.29  
 
While pushing for the broadening of Indian support to sections within South Africa, 
Chari advocated keeping all channels of communications with South Africa open. Until then, 
India had focused its energies at making a case against South Africa the UN. In 1947, a chain 
of letters had passed between Nehru and Smuts for initiating bilateral discussions, but 
procedural rather than substantive issues seemed to guide their concerns and these overtures 
failed.30 Chari was aware that India could not rely only on shaming South Africa at the UN. 
The solution eventually would have to come through talks. The departure of Smuts from 
power, Chari felt, provided a window of opportunity for India. The new Prime Minister, D.F. 
Malan, was more conservative but was also keener and more earnest to solve the Indian issue. 
Smuts had a tendency to ‘let things develop’ and prevaricate on the Indian issue. Although a 
liberal, Smuts was reluctant to expend his hard earned political capital on an issue that 
touched the raw nerve of the South African white community, especially the mostly-English 
province of Natal. This was evident in Smuts’s previous face-off with Indian diplomats in the 
1920s. In strategic terms, while Smuts’s internationalist liberalism meant that his original 
win-set in negotiations on the Indian question was larger than Malan, without a sound 
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domestic base he was reluctant to enlarge it further. Malan, in contrast, came with a smaller 
win-set but eager to gain international legitimacy and more sure-footed about his domestic 
legitimacy, he was likely to be far more elastic during negotiations.31 In fact, Malan, in the 
past, had been a part of two roundtable conferences with India and was instrumental in 
achieving the Cape Town Agreement of 1927. However, there was only a small window of 
opportunity here. Any talks would have to happen before Malan had committed domestically 
in the form of an anti-Indian law and frozen his own win-set.  
 
Based on these assumptions, Chari suggested to the MEA to seriously consider 
holding a Roundtable Conference as soon as Malan came to power. In any case, UN 
resolutions which were deemed condemnatory were likely to cut much less ice with Malan 
than Smuts and hence direct negotiations were preferable. Further, Chari argued that Indian 
passive resistance in South Africa was beginning to wane and talks between the governments 
will give South African Indians a breathing space and an honourable exit to withdraw from 
passive resistance.32  
 
Following these reports from Chari, the Indian government shed its dogmatism about 
opening another channel of talks with the South African government, except at the UN. It 
was now keener to pursue talks with South Africa and Pakistan, and this resulted in 
preliminary talks at Pretoria. Although an agreement for conducting a Roundtable was 
achieved at these talks, the Group Areas Act in 1950 effectively killed hopes of such a 
conference.   
 
 Suggesting these changes in Indian strategy, Chari also advised the MEA to restrict – 
if possible, do away with – its cooperation with Pakistan on the matter.33 In Chari’s opinion, 
Pakistan was weakening India’s negotiating hand, first by unscrupulously lifting the trade ban 
and more generally by diluting its opposition to South Africa. He argued that Pakistan had 
little interest in South African Indians, as there were only 80 people of Pakistani origin in 
South Africa. Given its limited interest, Pakistan was deliberately toning down its opposition 
to South Africa because of which the Indian position seemed excessively unreasonable to 
other countries. Eventually, however, while India could never disengage Pakistan from the 
issue at the UN even the South African diplomats at the UN felt that Pakistan was far less 
stringent in its criticisms and more generally resentful of India’s strong stance. 
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 Chari returned from South Africa in 1951. India did not send another Secretary and 
instead the office was run by Assistant Secretary, J.L. Malhautra. The High Commission did 
not last much longer either. For a long time, India had succeeded in retaining the High 
Commission despite turning down repeated requests from South Africa to send the High 
Commissioner back. Eventually, in May 1954, South Africa requested that India either send a 
High Commissioner or close the High Commission. Despite the fact that the High 
Commission had played a significant role in framing India’s strategy, India was left with no 
option but to close it in July 1954.   
 
 Chari’s stay was critical in developing India’s position on South Africa. Lacing moral 
injunctions with strategic wisdom, Chari advanced the cause of India-African solidarity 
without advocating just a dogmatic boycott. Instead he advanced arguments for strategic uses 
of symbol and substance in pursuit of India’s morally superior positions.  
 
His promising diplomatic life was cut short by cancer. He died in September 1955 at 
the age of 42. But shortly before he died, the unity of the oppressed – Indians and Africans - 
in South Africa that he had strived for and pushed the Indian government to acknowledge and 
support was enshrined in the Freedom Charter. His role in Indian diplomatic history remains 
unacknowledged, like many others. But in South Africa he was, Ismail Meer tells us, a 
‘household name’ who practiced India’s postcolonial strategy of integrating moral positions 
and strategic compulsions in envisioning a non-racial polity.34  
 
Negotiating ‘unreasoning prejudice’: India and Canada 
Unlike in South Africa, Indian diplomats in Canada and Australia were not prepared to 
undermine relations to achieve goals of racial discrimination. Given that India-South Africa 
relations were quite strained, Chari had a greater leeway in expressing his critical opinions 
within South Africa as well as to the MEA headquarters in Delhi than his counterparts in 
Canada and Australia. We can still see, however, that ending racial restrictions in these 
former settler colonies was still central to the practice of Indian diplomacy. Canada supported 
India’s independence and in the period considered here, was able to develop what has 
sometimes been considered a ‘special relationship’, albeit one that disintegrated quickly.35 
There were two issues of racial discrimination and immigration that India sought to attack: 
the internal discrimination towards Indians already residing in Canada and the discriminatory 
polices denying Indians the ability to immigrate. All Indians in Canada had been asked to 
10 
report to the government in 1939, solely so that the government could gauge their 
population. 36  They were not deported, but were also denied any official status. After 
independence, the Indian government raised this matter with Canada, and negotiations 
followed quickly.  
 
Discussions occurred because Canadian diplomats in Delhi had hinted informally, 
prior to partition, to Indian foreign affairs officials that they would be prepared to take 
representations from the Government of India on the matter. Leslie Chance, a Canadian 
Diplomat based in Ottawa, suggested that they could consider drafting laws ‘more acceptable 
to the susceptibilities of the Indian people’.37 A few months prior, the interim Government of 
India requested that the Canadian Government pressure the government of British Columbia 
‘to confer the franchise on the small Indian community in that province and thus rectify the 
present anomalous position which is a source of humiliation to Indians’.38  
 
The immigration matter, and the possible negotiation, was put forward to the 
Canadians very early on as well. Bajpai, as was relayed to John Kearney, believed it would 
be impossible for India to remain part of the Commonwealth as a dominion.39 It would be 
possible, however, to remain as a republic, but it was politically difficult. Kearney cabled 
back to Ottawa: 
There are certain obstacles which if not removed, might make even this latter 
arrangement impossible, the chief of which is the immigration policy of some 
of the other Commonwealth nations, more particularly Australia and 
Canada.40 
 
Bajpai went on to argue (reportedly) that it would be far easier for Nehru to argue for 
membership in the Commonwealth ‘if Canada and Australia made an immigration concession 
such as was made some time ago by the United States’.41 The suggestion here was essentially 
that Australia’s and Canada’s restrictive immigration polices ensured that the Commonwealth 
was a space of discrimination - and not one that postcolonial India could be part of. Bajpai 
was willing to risk India’s relationship with the Commonwealth in order to extract 
concessions from Canada over its immigration policy, suggesting strongly that restrictive 
immigration policies deeply offended India. St. Laurent later gave his external affairs 
minister Lester Pearson full authority to do whatever was necessary to keep India in the 
Commonwealth, suggesting it was a major priority.42  
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 Canada had been handed important reasons to consider accepting some small 
concessions to India on its immigration policy. Kearney relayed Sir Girja Bajpai’s thoughts 
with some direct honesty: 
Frankly, I am a little jealous of the way the Government of the United States 
has handled the Indian immigration problem. It has succeeded in preventing 
large numbers going to the United States by a method which seems completely 
satisfactory and praiseworthy to India, and it is something which I think we 
might usefully keep in front of us.43 
 
With this, the goal of the Canadians becomes clearer: to enable relations with India to grow, 
keep India in the Commonwealth without having any ‘threat’ to the Canadian way of life 
being ‘disrupted’ by large numbers of Indians. Canada, despite its belief in its own liberal 
internationalism, held an identity tethered to its perception of self as a white dominion. In 
particular, the tales of three Indian diplomats in Canada are illustrative of India’s methods of 
fighting Canada’s racialized policies: Hardit Singh Malik, Santdas Kirpalani and Ramji R. 
Saskena. 
 
Hardit Singh Malik, Santdas Kirpalani and Canada’s discriminatory practices  
India’s first two high commissioners to Canada were both products of the British Raj. Hardit 
Singh Malik was a well-respected Sikh diplomat with a history of sporting prowess and 
service in the Indian Army. He had served in World War One with Canada’s foreign minister 
Lester Pearson.44 Santdas Kirpalani, who succeeded Malik after just two years, had similarly 
spent 34 years working with the Indian Civil Service prior to becoming a diplomat after 
independence.45 
  
Malik arrived in Canada just prior to Indian independence. He received a rousing 
welcome from the Indian community, especially the Sikh population. As he recalled in his 
memoirs, this deeply touched him and he felt committed to work for the citizenship rights of 
Indians in Canada.46 In his short stay in Canada, his principle two achievements were the 
beginning of a productive India-Canada relationship and the removal of internal 
discrimination against Indians. Unlike diplomats sent to Australia and South Africa, Malik 
was given the opportunity to participate in negotiations over the removal of discrimination 
against Indians already in Canada.  
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Following the removal of internal discrimination, Malik was sent to France, and 
replaced by Kirpalani two years early. Kirpalani was careful, as Malik was before him, not to 
antagonize the Canadians. Kirpalani reflected upon Canada’s understanding of India, as both 
supportive of India and seeking a close relationship, but unsure as to how to go about it:  
Many responsible Canadians recognize India as the one politically sound and 
economically stable country of Asia and want to get closer with India. The desire 
is there but the approach and methodology has not yet acquired articulation.47 
Kirpalani was responsible for the negotiation of an immigration agreement, which eventually 
led to a quota of 150 Indians allowed to emigrate to Canada per year.48 Unfortunately, very 
few details of this are available from the Indian side.  
Kirpalani dealt with matters gradually and carefully. He reported to the MEA that he 
had first negotiated successfully with Canada over the [regularization] of the entry of over 
200 Indians who entered Canada illegally. They then allowed [the admission of] the children 
of these illegal immigrants.’49 Canada then ‘agreed to consider favorably cases of young men 
whose immigration is sought for the purpose of marriage with girls of Indian descent already 
resident in Canada’.50 Once these concessions had been gained, he concluded, that he had 
taken up the ‘question of immigration quota for Indian Nationals … informally with the 
Department of External Affairs.’51 The finalized agreement was entered into in January 1951, 
and Kirpalani departed just a few months later. 52  
 
That negotiation over matters of immigration happened at all needs to be emphasized 
strongly here. As will be seen in the case of Australia, the matter of racial discrimination was 
not openly discussed, and so no negotiations ever took place. It is clear that India’s policy on 
commenting on these matters was contextual rather than ironclad: in the case of Canada, it 
was worth making such a request as doing so had some hope of success. As a result of this 
agreement the perception of Canada in India had risen sharply. As John Kearney, Canadian 
High Commissioner to India put it, ‘compared to fellow Commonwealth countries, however, 
such as South Africa and Australia, Canada in Indian eyes is regarded almost as a paragon of 
virtue, especially since the granting to Indians federal and provincial franchise.’ 53  This 
immigration quota of 150 Indians was most certainly a token agreement. The Canadians had 
been careful to maintain their sense of whiteness with such small token. However, for the 
Indians the principle that an Indian could become a Canadian was more important than the 
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practice. In the long run, however, once the principle had been enshrined, the practice of 
allowing Indians to move to Canada was sure to follow.   
 
Ramji Saksena and the India Quota 
Given how easily negotiations on the position of people of Indian origin in British Colombia 
and the immigration agreement had proceeded, the Canadians might not have expected any 
further troubles on this front. The quota, however, was an obviously token arrangement. 
Despite India’s willingness to accept a token quota of emigrants, the matter was not closed. 
Ramji Sasksena replaced Malik early in 1951. In 1953 and 1954, towards the end of his 
tenure Saksena complained to the Canadian government about ongoing racial prejudices in 
Canada’s immigration policies, including those within the original agreement negotiated. The 
provision allowing for the wives and families to immigrate to Canada but explicitly excluded 
any immigrants of an ‘Asiatic race’. The Canadian immigration agreement allowed various 
benefits to family members and to people entering Canada in order to marry a legal resident 
of Canada. However, these immigrants had to be included as part of the quota, and could not 
enter outside of it. Saksena enquired ‘informally’ as to whether or not this proviso might be 
changed, to allow more Indians into Canada.54 He argued that the number of Indians in 
Canada had actually dropped from 5,000 to 1,200 since 1908, and that under his plan, it 
would still take several years for the number to rise back to such a level. In this sense, the 
argument that Indians might disrupt Canadian life was somewhat absurd. Saksena later 
argued that: 
The grievance of Canadian East-Indians that in this regard they were being 
discriminated against on grounds of race, has not been removed wholly or even 
partly. My submission to the Minister was that he might now feel disposed to 
grant Canadian East-Indians the same rights as were enjoyed by other Canadian 
nationals. I had also pointed out that the grant of this privilege would not have 
any far-reaching effect as the numbers involved were, on the whole, small. 55 
 
He continued ‘your regulations force a Canadian East Indian, in case he desires to marry an 
Indian national, to incur substantial expenditure in travelling to and from India. You thus 
place in his way a formidable obstacle.’56 The other option for Indians in Canada wishing to 
marry an Indian was to have them counted under the quota. Saskena continued, ‘This, if I 
might say so with respect, is adding insult to injury. You debit to the annual quota, small as it 
is, a number of person or persons who should be allowed to enter Canada in their own 
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right.’57 By using the quota, Indian-Canadians took the place of another Indian who may wish 
to emigrate. Crucially, white immigrants faced no such test.  
 
Saksena further argued that Indians in British Colombia had assimilated, and ‘acted 
Canadian’, suggesting that: 
…the fear that new entrants from India will remain isolated and conspicuous 
as their compatriots of an elder generation is, therefore, in my view, entirely 
wrong and is based on an unreasoning prejudice which unfortunately still 
exists.58 
 
He concluded that ‘…from whatever point of view you may look at the position the 
maintenance of discrimination in regard to admission of relatives against this small minority 
is undesirable, injurious and without justification.’59  
 
Laval Fortier of the immigration department relayed his concerns to Dana Wilgress of 
the MEA, commenting that that ‘Mr Saksena does not seem to know that the Canada-India 
agreement on Immigration was suggested by his government.’60 He continued: ‘Mr Saskena’s 
attitude is somewhat ambiguous. One may wonder if his representations are made as High 
Commissioner for India or as representative of the Canadian East Indian racial origin living 
in Canada.’61 Fortier dismissed Saksena’s right to advocate for Canadian citizens of Indian 
dissent – as they had become Canadian citizens. No such complaint was raised in 1947. 
Later, Escott Reid wrote Saksena off, over the immigration issue and his criticism of a 
decision by the US to sell arms to Pakistan: 
…one of those Indians who combines a love of the kind of life he can lead in 
North America with the most violent criticism of the United States. He could 
have had the post of head of the Colombo Plan directorate in New Delhi but he 
pleaded an ancient lung condition as a reason for not returning to ‘the tropics’. 
He is a favorite of R. K. Nehru’s and Mrs. Pandit’s whom he flatters. 62 
 
Saksena is depicted here as irrational and difficult. Even though India was initially invited to 
act on behalf of Canada’s Indian population, this opportunity was revoked by 1954. While 
some Indian diplomats were determined to resist colonial legacies wherever they found them, 
others were more pragmatic. Raghavan Pillai, for example, spoke frequently and kindly to 
Reid, and was responsible for Reid’s later belief that Saksena was prone to overstepping his 
boundaries with the MEA.63 
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From the pragmatic Malik and Kirpalani, to the more aggressive Saksena, Indian 
diplomats consistently sought to undermine Canada’s racist policies, with some success. 
India pragmatically pursued concessions over immigration, having successfully gained the 
right to intervene on behalf of disenfranchised Indians. By the time of his departure, however, 
Saksena frustrated the Canadians with his more aggressive critique of racial discrimination in 
Canada’s policies. It was clear to all involved that a quota of 150 was a token, but one mostly 
acceptable to the Indians as they wished the Canadians to accept the principle of Indian 
immigration. India’s diplomats combated Canada’s discriminatory practices through a 
mixture of threats, negotiation and finally, an outspoken critique. By the time this critique 
was made, however, Canadian diplomats had moved on from seeing it as reasonable for 
Indians to intervene in their practices of racial discrimination. When operating in a more 
favourable environment, the Indian diplomats were able to open negotiations and raise the 
issue directly. These successes were tempered by the limitations of diplomacy. Nehruvian 
globalism sought non-interference and friendly relations with other countries where possible. 
This led to a combination of friendly nudging and negotiation from some diplomats, and 
outright critique from others. This shows that Indian diplomatic practice in Canada dealt with 
issues of race and racism on a day-to-day basis. While in Canada they faced a friendly 
environment, Indian diplomats operated in far more difficult circumstances in Australia.  
 
Official Silence, Unofficial Resistance: India and the White Australia Policy 
While India’s diplomats found relatively easy environment within which to operate in 
Canada, they were not nearly so lucky in Australia. First, Bajpai’s suggestion that India might 
withdraw from the Commonwealth if it was perceived as a racist organisation does not seem 
to have been repeated to the Australians. Here, the Indians were tactful, and mostly resisted 
silently through their form of diplomatic practice. Numerous Indian diplomats mention in 
dispatches, however, that the Australians were ‘jittery’ or anxious about their immigration 
policy and criticized it, keeping track of it on a regular basis. Indeed, we would go so far as to 
argue that an official silence was a considerable part of India’s approach to the White 
Australia policy. However, unofficial, unsanctioned criticisms were made by at least one 
Indian diplomat.  
 
  Jawaharlal Nehru very rarely commented on the White Australia policy.  There was 
one occasion, however, when Nehru was asked if he thought there was a place for a White 
Australia in Asia. He responded that Australia could justify the policy in short term, provided 
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it was only done so for economic reasons, rather than racial ones. He added that in the long 
term ‘…it is difficult to see in the world today how far it is possible to keep a vast continent 
undeveloped’. He went on to further say that ‘Australia should not discriminate against the 
rights and privileges of Asians living there’.64 This was grossly misinterpreted by Herbert 
Evatt, Australian foreign minister as an assurance that Nehru supported the White Australia 
policy.65 Nehru responded that: 
 
In the course of an interview with an Australian Newspaper correspondent 
some time ago I stated that I could understand an emigration policy based on 
economic considerations with a view to maintain certain standards and ways 
of living, but that I thought a racial policy was wrong and to be deprecated.66  
  
Nehru was pressed on this by an Australian Labor Party Member, to which an MEA 
undersecretary responded: ‘it is essentially an Australian question within the sovereign 
jurisdiction of your people and parliament’.67 
 
A consideration of Indian diplomatic practice in Australia, however, leads to a very 
different interpretation. The first Indian High Commissioner to Australia was Ragunath 
Paranjpye. Paranjpye held the post prior to independence, and served only during the Ben 
Chifley government. Sadly, only limited official sources are available on his tenure, but his 
memoirs provide a useful account of the period. He took as his starting point that ‘there were 
no intricate political questions between the countries’ during his time in Australia.68 In his 
mind, this meant that ‘the main function of the High Commissioner and his Office was to 
make India better known to Australia’. This being the case, the main struggle for Paranjpye 
was the White Australia policy, which he believed ‘naturally this causes a great deal of heart-
burning and resentment among non-white people’, and particularly offended Indians.69  
 
Paranjpye also emphasized that, while this was offensive to India, it was not the place 
of the High Commission to actively attack a domestic policy. He argued that argued that 
changing this policy was not the place of India, but that it could be brought about by a ‘better 
understanding among different nations, through closer trade and cultural relations, and 
through an increase in tourist traffic.70 Thus, educating the Australians about India was his 
focus, attempting to dispel stereotypes and misperceptions of India in Australia. This became 
a very important practice of lager senior Indian diplomats in Australia.  
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In 1947, under the tenure of High Commissioner Daya Singh Bedi, it was debated 
between the MEA and the Indian High Commission in India whether or not it was within the 
bounds of the ministry to consider and keep track of the Australia’s immigration policy.71 It 
was concluded by the MEA that, while it was not their place to complain, it was within their 
remit to report on the policy. India and Indian diplomats, as will be seen, instead took the 
approach more generally of trying to raise the profile of India in Australia in the hope that a 
more informed Australian public would appreciate India’s non-alignment and opposition to 
racism and discrimination in world affairs. On a visit to Queensland, Bedi argued to the MEA 
that ‘although there is no racial discrimination, particularly in the common man, there is that 
racial prejudice which is inherent in the white man and it will take time before that is finally 
eradicated.’72 He continued that ‘they will be inclined to adhere to the tradition of following 
in the wake of the British and to an extent the United States of America’, as Australia was 
‘very much concerned to save [its] “white democracy” in the southern hemisphere…’.73 The 
rest of Bedi’s tenure is very poorly documented at the NAI, though he was clearly concerned 
about Australia’s racist practices.  
 
General Kodandera Cariappa and the White Australia Policy 
While the official policy of India was not to interfere directly with the White Australia 
policy, but to report on it and to raise the profile of India, one Indian diplomat, General 
Kodandera Cariappa, spoke out against the policy without official consent from the MEA. 
Cariappa was pulled out of retirement from the Indian army personally by Jawaharlal Nehru 
to act as High Commissioner to Australia. He was deeply idealistic about the Indian Army, 
and believed in the ideals of the British Empire. His experience in Australia, however, 
severely tested his beliefs. Cariappa was quoted as saying in the Courier Mail ‘what you 
people are doing is driving the people of India and Pakistan away from the British 
Commonwealth and into the arms of Communism.’74 
 
Cariappa’s comments were widely reported in the press, generating very negative 
coverage. An editorial in The Argus expressed the hope that the intensity of the debate would 
die down so that a conversation could take place about the white Australia policy as shaping 
Australia’s international relations without ‘wanting to fling off our coats and punch General 
Cariappa and other critics on the nose.’ The editorial continued that ‘…it is about time that 
Australians, like any family which is doing something to irritate the near neighbors, took a 
good look at the White Australia policy in the light of today’s realities.’75 
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Following the controversy, Cariappa attempted to clarify his position by trying to 
appeal to Commonwealth and military solidarity in an interview with Reveille an official 
publication of the Australian RSL.76 He wrote that ‘Indians have shared in battles and shed 
their blood in protecting this precious heritage’. For Cariappa, this meant that Indians ‘should 
not be denied a natural equality with other immigrations from countries of the British 
Commonwealth.’77 His argument was also tied, perhaps due to its intended audience, to 
World War Two, as he argued that the offence of Indian servicemen was heightened as ‘tens 
of thousands of Germans and Italians have been encouraged to emigrate to Australia.’78 
 
Throughout this argument, he makes it clear that only very limited numbers of Indians 
would want to immigrate to Australia, and that a quota system would be inoffensive. He 
further underlined Australia and India’s connections through the Commonwealth: 
 
As a solider myself, I believe that strategically Australia needs India’s 
continued friendship. The Parliamentary Constitution of India, the principles on 
which its political life functions, all stem from the home of democracy – Great 
Britain.79 
 
Here, Cariappa evokes a shared colonial heritage to argue that the White Australia policy 
discriminated against Commonwealth allies in favour of WWII enemies. This argument was 
extremely well tailored to its audience. 
 
The official response to Cariappa’s comments was muted, despite the press hysteria.  
Walter Crocker, Australia’s High Commissioner in India investigated briefly, and concluded 
that Cariappa’s ‘standing with the powers-that-be here is weak’ and that the MEA believed 
him to ‘have failed in Australia… due to his vanity’.80 Crocker did, however, discuss the 
matter with the Commonwealth Secretary Subimal Dutt, who reportedly told him that Indians 
had ‘no interest in Australian immigration policy’.81 Crocker concluded that Dutt ‘obviously 
thinks that Cariappa is not all there’ in his failure to follow the government line.82 Given 
Cariappa stayed in Australia until 1956, he was too easily dismissed by the Australians.  
 
Following the negative press commentary, Cariappa wrote to N.R. Pillai, then 
Secretary General of the MEA. He complained that Indians were not well treated in 
Australia, and were not given the rights that they should have as citizens: 
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Having met a number of Indian settlers here and in New Zealand… I cannot 
help the feeling that the people of this country, although they profess to be 
very democratic, simple friendly and all that, have a very poor opinion of 
Asians in regard to our standards of living and so on.83 
 
He further wrote that he had tried to use the Commonwealth as a means of shifting opinions 
on Indians, but was always told that ‘if we took you what about the Chinese and the 
Japanese…’.84 He concluded: ‘This is the way they think. They are scared stiff of Asians 
over-running their country if the relaxed their Immigration policy!!’85 He felt that he was 
unable to leave immediately, instead changing his ‘mission’ in Australia to change the 
Australian people’s mind with regard to Indians and Asia in general. As he put it, ‘Self-
respect demands that I must return at once, but my sense of duty to our people demands that I 
should stay here’.86 
 
Cariappa further expressed his irritation at Australia’s obsessive racist fears, though 
this time with regards to standards of living rather than immigration policy. His annual report 
of 1954: ‘in everything they say or do, I frequently hear, to the extent of being tired of 
hearing, such expressions “we must maintain our high standards of living and therefore we 
must have only such people living with us who have our high standards”’87.  He continued: ‘I 
have often asked Australians what exactly this means… no one has given me a satisfactory 
answer.’88 Much of the tone of Cariappa’s writings on Australia in private communications 
implies his irritation with Australia’s foreign and security policy. He further complained of 
Australia’s crippling fear of communism, writing that, as far as he could gather Australia 
‘seems to be obsessed with the fear that Communism is almost at her door-steps and her 
security, therefore, is very gravely in danger.’89 Cariappa was not a professional diplomat, 
and perhaps had behaved in an unprofessional way by bringing up the policy. Judging by the 
tone of his writing, he found Australia’s endemic racism deeply depressing.  
 
Cariappa, Paranjpye and Bedi had to control their instincts and temper the anticolonial 
framings of Nehruvian foreign policy. They were acting in an environment where being 
‘emotional’ was seen as both weak and particularly Indian, and so had to remain tactful. As 
the response to Cariappa’s comment shows, any public statement against the White Australia 
policy was sure to be met with accusations of Indian hypersensitivity and emotionalism. And 
yet, the Australians, Canadians, and South Africans were just as sensitive to perceived Indian 
‘hypersensitivity’ as Indians were sensitive to racism. By staying mostly quiet, disrupting 
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stereotypes and raising the profile of India, these diplomats were able to resist racial 
discrimination while tactfully showing their displeasure. When Cariappa did speak out, he 
did so forcefully and by tailoring his arguments to his audience, appealing to the 
Commonwealth and shared sacrifices rather than wild accusations of racism. For the most 
part, though, the Indians were careful not to speak openly, as they knew this would be 
unhelpful. Nehruvian globalism as a discourse had to be tempered through a strategic and 
cautious approach was. As such, Indian diplomats saved their public condemnations for 
South Africa and practiced a subtle form dissent in Australia and Canada, so as to gradually 
reshape the attitudes of these settler-colonies. 
 
Conclusion: Foreign policy as Postcolonial Practice 
 
India’s independence was, in the words of WEB Du Bois, ‘the greatest historical date of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century’.90 The pan-Africanist scholar had hailed it as the inaugural 
move of de-racialization of the world. But these proclamations had to be tempered with the 
limits of diplomatic practice. With some notable exceptions, Indian diplomats in Canada and 
Australia were cautious, tactful seeking to educate these settler-colonial states about India, 
disrupting stereotypes, and arguing against discriminatory policies only when such arguments 
were ready to be heard. In South Africa, however, such practices had long been exhausted 
before independence. The political struggle in South Africa was in far more advanced stages, 
as both South African Indians and Indian diplomats had long been seeking to dismantle South 
Africa’s racist practices. Consequently India was prepared to refuse diplomatic relations, 
amid loud and very public condemnations of racial policies, so abhorrent was apartheid to 
postcolonial India. In each case, the context shaped the method of resistance. India’s efforts 
were largely successful in Canada, less so in Australia, and ultimately could not persuade 
South Africa to give up its racist policies. They did, however, play a key role in South Africa 
becoming an international pariah, and the pressure generated was eventually part of the end 
of apartheid regime. In each case, however, they succeeded in making racial discrimination 
an international issue.  
 
  Nehruvian globalism as the dominant ideology of India’s foreign policy was 
constrained by India’s entry into international diplomatic circles after independence. India’s 
postcolonial national interest, as it was constructed, lay in the removal of racial 
discrimination and the decolonization of world order. It pursued this goal throughout the 
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Commonwealth by various means. Many of these Indian diplomats had been educated 
through British institutions, and had respect for international norms of non-interference. They 
could not pursue this goal single-mindedly - as a civil society group like the NAACP was 
able to do from America.91 They were, however, prepared to take such an approach with 
South Africa. At each and every opportunity, however, Indian diplomats nudged their 
Australian and Canadian colleagues within the ‘acceptable’ confines of the international 
system India now found itself. ‘The problem of racialism and racial separation’, Nehru stated 
in 1954, ‘may become more dangerous than any other problem that the world has to face’.92 
Aware of the discursive ramifications of the security driven discourse of post-WW II era, 
Nehru recognized that India ‘cannot do anything effective’ by ‘mere shouting’ from every 
platform. Instead, he said, ‘we remain quiet’.93 Yet, between and betwixt these shouts and 
silences, there remained the grey zone of subversive politics. The diplomats in South Africa, 
Canada and Australia played instrumental roles in surreptitiously and cautiously engineering 
a complex debate on racism. More than anything else, the responses of these diplomats were 
driven by the context rather than uncritical fealty to either moral politics or diplomatic 
practice based on just a narrow conception of material national interest.  
 
 This then, leads us to end this discussion with three general points about Indian 
foreign policy and international relations. First, as Nicolas Guilhot has persuasively argued, 
decolonisation and race were deliberately excised from narratives of post-World War II 
order.94 Security became the primary concern of theories and discussions on international 
relations. While this has, on the one hand, made our understanding of the ‘international’ 
poorer by enshrining a natural hierarchy of issue areas, on the other, it has hidden from us 
foreign policy practices that are deemed outside the remit of ‘security studies’. Consequently, 
the studies of Indian foreign policy, for instance, assume any discussions on ‘non-racial 
world order’ as inherently ‘moral’ discussions and hence not foreign policy per se. Yet, 
discussions of these issues - often assumed peripheral to foreign policy - were at the centre of 
India’s diplomacy because they had wider ramifications on India’s place in the world and its 
own understanding of self.  
 
 Second, the focus on diplomatic practices allows us to appreciate linkages between 
agency and structure, individuals and institutions, and discourse and practice.  In seeking to 
create a post-racist world, Indian diplomats often were not always aggressive – except 
perhaps at the United Nations. Instead, in this case, the supposed high-octane ‘revolt against 
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the West’95 was more about nudging, often gently, sometimes less so, the settler-colonial 
powers to end their practices of racial discrimination. The diplomats often nibbled at the 
boundaries of agreeable conduct but through this pushed the normative boundaries of the 
contemporary order. The practice of Indian diplomats, particularly in Australia and Canada, 
reveals a subtle resistance to the norm of non-interference. On a day-to-day basis these 
diplomats routinely looked for ways in which they could fight racial discrimination and 
challenge racialized stereotypes.  In South Africa, the moral talk of post-racial order was 
married with the desire for pragmatic results. But this went hand-in-hand with a course of 
self-correction – making a common cause with Africans (which was a significant departure 
from the Indians struggle in South Africa since the days of Gandhi). Collectively, this 
practice revealed to the policy makers, Nehru in particular, the limits as well as possibilities 
of India’s anti-racist discourse. Regardless of whether or not these diplomats were successful 
– and they were to a limited extent - this adds a new layer of understanding to the formulation 
of Indian foreign policy under Nehru. 
 
 Finally, and this is symbolic of the tyranny of the ‘great man’ school of diplomatic 
history, these Indian diplomats have been lost in India’s dusty, unexplored and overly 
censored archives. Without seeking to end on a lament, although Indian archival practices are 
themselves complicit in this dearth of information, diplomatic historians have also been 
responsible due to their reluctance to access and utilize these sources. Nevertheless, studies of 
Indian foreign policy would allow us a much wider canvas to paint with our analytical 
brushes if diplomatic history becomes at least an important sub-school of Indian IR.  
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